FINDING A CEILING IN A CIRCULAR ROOM: LOCKE V. DAVEY, FEDERALISM,
AND RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY
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The text of the U.S. Constitution clearly distinguishes religion from non-religion
by providing that while Congress may pass laws concerning many subjects and
prohibiting many things, Congress may not make laws respecting the establishment of
religion or prohibiting religious exercise.1 As the distinctiveness of religion is clear from
the text, the Court has had no problem settling that religion, as a subject matter, and
religious believers, as a class of persons, are constitutionally distinct.2 Though not
explicated in the text, it is equally clear, and equally settled, that the Religion Clauses tug
the government in opposite directions. Noting this tension, the Court has tread the line
between the Clauses carefully, holding that if the government opposes the establishment
of religion too vigorously it will burden religious exercise,3 and if the government seeks
to accommodate religious exercise too liberally it will establish religion.4 However,
while these propositions—that religion is distinct and that there is tension between the
Clauses—are clear and settled, the Court has struggled mightily to reconcile them. That
is, the Court has not been able to answer the following question: How differently may the
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1
The text of the Religion Clauses provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2
For example, the Court has held that because religion is constitutionally distinct from non-religion, the
Constitution requires the government to exempt people from laws that substantially burden their religious
beliefs; but the Constitution does not require the government to exempt people from laws that substantially
burden their secular conscientious beliefs. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) (“Thus,
if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary
secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated
himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was
philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the
Religion Clauses.”).
3
See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 228 (1978).
4
See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).

1

government treat religion from non-religion under one Clause without violating the
other?
In the government funding context, this bears on the question of whether states
may exclude religious organizations from generally available funding programs. This is
a question of both practical and normative significance. Practically, the question is quite
significant to many states considering K-12 voucher programs. If the answer to this
question is that the Free Exercise Clause requires the government to include religious
organizations in funding programs, then states must include religious schools in their
voucher programs. Consequently, tax dollars that have been reserved for secular schools
will soon end up going to religious schools. Although government funding of religious
education might be desirable for some,5 it is troubling for many American taxpayers.6
Significantly, because government funding of religious education is troubling for many
taxpayers, a constitutional rule requiring states to treat religious schools like secular
schools might discourage many states from experimenting with voucher programs. That
such a rule might discourage states from creating voucher programs is worrisome—not
only because voucher programs might be a good idea, but also because many low-income
communities might need this sort of educational experimentation.7 Alternatively, if the
answer to this question is that in pursuing the goals of the Establishment Clause the
government may exclude religious organizations from funding programs, then many
5

See, e.g., The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Schools, at
http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/topic/7.html (“The Becket Fund believes that government may not
specially exclude schools or students from government funding, or any other government benefit, simply
because they are religious.”)
6
See, e.g., Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Vouchers/Religious School Funding, at
http://www.au.org/site/PageServer?pagename=issues_vouchers (“Americans must be free to contribute
only to the religious groups of their choosing. Voucher programs violate this principle by forcing all
taxpayers to underwrite religious education.”)
7
See Black Alliance for Educational Options, Tax-Supported Scholarships (Vouchers), at
http://www.baeo.org/programs?program_id=5&program_category_secondary_page_id=20.
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deserving and benevolent organizations might be discriminated against under the guise of
the U.S. Constitution. That their Constitution sanctions this discrimination would
surprise, and even worse, upset, many Americans.
Normatively, the question is quite significant to constitutional lawyers and
scholars. If the answer to this question is that the Free Exercise Clause requires the
government to include religious organizations in funding programs, then James
Madison’s argument about the taxpayer’s conscience8 will be eradicated from First
Amendment law, and thus, a foundational work on church-state relations will no longer
apply to constitutional adjudication. Additionally, if the government must include
religious organizations in their funding programs, the discretion that states have in
developing their own church-state partnerships will be limited. This limitation on state
discretion is an important addition to church-state law because many believe that the
Religion Clauses were originally intended and understood to grant states control over
how they partner with religious organizations.9 However, if the answer to this question is
that the government may exclude religious organizations from generally available
funding programs, there is a risk that the primary criterion of church-state
jurisprudence—neutrality towards religion—will be lost.
This Article attempts to answer the question of how differently the government
may treat religion from non-religion under one Clause without violating the other. My
8

In his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, James Madison argued that
government funding of religion violates the taxpayer’s conscience. The Remonstrance can be found in 8
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 300 (Robert A. Rutland et al eds., 1973). The Remonstrance also can
be found in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947) (appendix to opinion of Rutledge, J.
dissenting).
9
See STEVEN SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 17-54 (Oxford University Press 1995); and EDWARD S. CORWIN, A CONSTITUTION OF
POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE 106 (Michie Co., 1951) (declaring that "the principal importance of the
[First] Amendment lay in the separation which it effected between the respective jurisdictions of State and
nation regarding religion . . . .").
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answer is inspired and informed by the Court’s 2004 decision in Locke v. Davey.10 In
Davey, the Court addressed a claim by a student, Joshua Davey, that the State of
Washington unconstitutionally excluded him from the Washington State Promise
Scholarship.—a college scholarship awarded only to those students who satisfied certain
academic,11 financial,12 geographic, 13 and religious14 requirements. Joshua Davey
satisfied the first three conditions, but because he declared a double major in Business
Administration and Pastoral Ministries at a religious college, Davey failed to satisfy the
fourth condition prohibiting the use of the Promise Scholarship for the study of religion
from a devotional perspective.. After Washington denied him the scholarship, Davey
claimed that Washington violated three provisions of the U.S. Constitution15 by denying
Davey the scholarship based on his decision to major in Pastoral Ministries at a religious
college. The Court rejected Davey’s claim, holding that at least in certain contexts the
government may exclude an individual from a funding program on the basis of religion.

10

540 US 712 (2004).
Washington provided scholarships only to students who ranked in the top 15% of the graduating class, or
who had performed a 1200 or better on the Scholastic Assessment Test I, or a score of 27 or better on the
American College Test. Id. at 716.
12
Washington provided scholarships only to students with a family income below 135% of the state
median. Id.
13
Washington provided scholarships only to students who “enroll at ‘least half time in an eligible
postsecondary institution in the state of Washington.’” Id.
14
Washington provided scholarships only to students who did not pursue a degree in theology at the
institution while receiving the scholarship. Id. It should be noted this is a statutory requirement that
“simply codifies the State’s constitutional prohibition” on public funding of religious education. Id. It also
should be noted that this fourth requirement permits applicants to major in theology from an academic
perspective but does not permit applicants to major in theology from a perspective that is "devotional in
nature or designed to induce religious faith.” Id.
15
One, Davey claimed that Washington violated the Free Speech Clause by discriminating on the basis of
viewpoint—that is, Washington refused to fund Davey’s studies because Davey decided to study religion
from a devotional perspective. Two, Davey claimed that Washington violated the Free Exercise Clause by
burdening his religious exercise with a religiously discriminatory law. And three, Davey argued that
Washington violated the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating on the basis of religion. It should be
noted that the merits of Davey’s free speech and equal protection claims will not be addressed in this
Article.
11
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Much that has been written about Davey has been negative. Immediately after the
Court issued the decision, the Council for Christian Colleges & Universities expressed its
disappointment with the ruling.16 Several conservative publications featured articles
criticizing the decision.17 And several legal scholars sharply derided the Davey Court’s
reasoning.18 Perhaps the most incisive academic criticism has come from Professor
Laycock, who warned in his Harvard Law Review article that the decision’s
maximization of “government discretion and judicial deference . . . threatens religious
liberty.”19
In this Article, I take on these critiques of Davey. In so doing, I hope to
accomplish three goals: (1) to defend the holding and reasoning in Davey; (2) to assuage
the concerns of Davey’s critics; and (3) to develop a paradigm that grants states discretion
over how they partner with religious organization but still limits states in a way that is
consistent with the guarantees in the Religion Clauses. These goals are addressed in
three Parts.

16

Council for Christian Colleges & Universities, Statement on Locke v. Davey, at
http://www.cccu.org/news/newsID.260,parentNav.Archives/news_past_detail.asp (“On behalf of its 129
U.S. members and affiliates, the Council for Christian Colleges & Universities expresses its disappointment
with today's ruling in Locke v. Davey . . . .”).
17
See, e.g., National Review Online, Open Door to Religious Discrimination, at
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/dokupil200402270920.asp (claiming that the Promise
Scholarship “wrongfully discriminates against religion” and accusing the Davey decision of “erod[ing] the
principle of neutrality toward religion”).
18
Professor Eugene Volokh has criticized the opinion in his blog. See The Volokh Conspiracy,
Discrimination Against Religion, at http://volokh.com/2004_02_22_volokh_archive.html (“I think Justice
Scalia's dissent is far more persuasive than the Chief Justice's majority opinion. The one good thing I can
say about the case is that the opinions are short enough that they'll be less trouble than usual to excerpt in
my 2004 casebook supplement.”). Also, Professor Stephen Bainbridge harshly criticized the opinion in his
blog, approvingly citing Professor Volokh’s criticism and suggesting that the opinion upheld anti-Catholic
bigotry. See Professor Bainbridge, Eugene Volokh on Locke v. Davey, at
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/2003/12/eugene_volokh_o.html. For a longer and more detailed
critique of the opinion, see Thomas Berg & Douglas Laycock, Davey's Mistakes and the Future of State
Payments for Services Provided by Religious Institutions, 40 TULSA L.J. 2 (2005).
19
Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the
Extremes But Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 161 (2004).
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Part I defends Davey. This defense begins by establishing the proposition that
Davey is a case about both Religion Clauses. After Part I.A demonstrates that Davey is
about both Religion Clauses, Part I.B branches into an analysis of Davey’s claim under
each Clause. Part I.B.1 analyzes the claim under the Free Exercise Clause. This Subpart
concludes that Washington’s decision not to fund religious instruction is not a clear
violation of the Free Exercise Clause; this conclusion rests on the distinction between
Davey and three categories of free exercise violations. Part I.B.2 analyzes Washington’s
interest in excluding Davey under the Establishment Clause. This Subpart concludes that
states have a substantial interest in developing policies on church-state relations that both
prevent taxpayers from experiencing a conscientious burdening and that encourage
harmony among different religious groups.
Part II claims that Davey’s grant of discretion to states in developing church-state
partnerships might have many salutary effects. Considering the intent of the Framers,
empirical data, and recent legal scholarship, this Part contends that discretion can lead to
greater religious liberty and political accountability in the states.
Part III develops a paradigm that circumscribes state discretion—a paradigm in
which the states have discretion to experiment with different levels of both the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, but also a paradigm in which both
religious disestablishment and liberty are guaranteed.
I. DEFENDING DAVEY
A. Why Davey Is a Case about Both Religion Clauses
Whether framed as a critique or a defense of Davey, every significant piece of
scholarship on Davey has analyzed the merits of Davey’s claim exclusively in terms of
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the Free Exercise Clause.20 That many have limited their discussions of Davey to the
Free Exercise Clause should not come as a surprise. After all, limiting a discussion of
Davey to the Free Exercise Clause makes quite a bit of sense if one thinks about the case
linearly. The linear equation is as follows:
Davey claimed that Washington violated his right to exercise his religious beliefs,
a right incorporated to Washington through the 14th Amendment. Washington defended
its exclusion of Davey by denying that the exclusion violated Davey’s right to exercise
his religious beliefs, and by arguing that Washington was required by the
disestablishment mandate in its state constitution to exclude Davey from the program.
Since the Supremacy Clause means that Washington’s obligations under the U.S.
Constitution trump any obligations Washington has under its state constitution,21 it
follows that the dispute between Davey and Washington came down to the Free Exercise
Clause.
Although categorizing Davey as a straightforward free exercise case certainly
seems right under this linear equation, such a categorization is wrong because it ignores
the substantial role that the Establishment Clause played in the case. Following is a
discussion of three ways in which the Establishment Clause was involved.
1. The Establishment Clause provides the background for Washington’s
interest in excluding Davey.
Washington claimed that it excluded Davey in order to protect taxpayers from the
burden of conscience that results when the government uses tax dollars to fund religion.
20

This is not to say that commentators have not discussed the background issue of what the government
may not fund under the Establishment Clause. Instead, this is to say that in analyzing whether or not
Davey’s claim should have prevailed, commentators have focused on the fact that “Davey's claim appeared
to be a slam dunk under Lukumi.” Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and
Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 173 (2004).
21
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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Significantly, Washington’s interest in protecting its taxpayers is the same interest that
James Madison had in mind in his Remonstrance. The relationship between
Washington’s exclusion of Davey and Madison’s Remonstrance is significant because the
Remonstrance is enmeshed in the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. For
example, in Everson v. Board of Education,22 the landmark case incorporating the
Establishment Clause, the Court cited the Remonstrance as a basis for finding that a
primary purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect citizens from this conscientious
burden—this, in both the majority23 and dissenting24 opinions. Thus, Washington’s
interest in excluding Davey is part of a long tradition of protecting citizens from religious
establishment—a tradition, moreover, that underlies the Court’s understanding of the
Establishment Clause, and a tradition, perhaps, that inspired the adoption of the Clause.25
Because Washington’s exclusion of Davey is part of this tradition, Washington’s
exclusion is understood best by discussing the tradition. Therefore, many of the concerns
that underlie the Establishment Clause—specifically, the problems that arise when the
government directly or indirectly funds religious instruction—are relevant to a discussion
of Davey.
2. Washington’s justification for excluding Davey under its state
constitution is directly related to the Rehnquist Court’s narrow
interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
22

330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).
See id. at 13 (noting that “[t]his Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the First
Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles, had
the same objective and were intended to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on
religious liberty as the Virginia statute”).
24
See id. at 37 (Rutledge, J. dissenting) (finding that “the Remonstrance is at once the most concise and the
most accurate statement of the views of the First Amendment's author concerning what is 'an establishment
of religion.'”).
25
LEONARD W. LEVY, “THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT,” in RELIGION AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER 44 (Baylor University
Press, 1984) (noting that there is a broad and a narrow interpretation of the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause, and that “[t]he heart of this broad interpretation is that the First Amendment
prohibits even government aid impartially and equitably administered to all religious groups.”).
23
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The relationship between Washington’s citation of its state constitution and the
Rehnquist Court’s narrow interpretation of the Establishment Clause is evident by
imagining that the dispute between Davey and Washington arose before Zelman.
Before the Court decided Zelman in 2002 it was unclear whether the
Establishment Clause permitted states to provide substantial funding for religious
instruction.26 Thus, if Davey arose before Zelman, a critical constitutional question
would have been whether Washington could include Davey in the program under the
Establishment Clause. Accordingly, if Davey arose before Zelman, Washington surely
would have cited the Establishment Clause in order to justify its exclusion of Davey.
However, because Davey arose after Zelman, it was clear that the Establishment
Clause permitted Washington to include Davey in the program. As this was clear,
Washington could not turn to the U.S. Constitution as a justification for excluding Davey.
Instead, Washington had to turn to its own constitution. Thus, Washington’s reliance on
its own constitution instead of the U.S. Constitution can be understood as an incident of
the views that the five Justices in the Zelman majority, two of whom are no longer on the
bench,27 held on the Establishment Clause.
This is significant because the Zelman majority expressed a view on the
Establishment Clause that sharply diverges from the views held by the four Justices
26

Some might point to Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) for the
proposition that the government may indirectly provide substantial funding to religious organizations. But
Witters does not support this proposition because that case came down to the fact that under the program
“only a small handful [of the recipients] are sectarian” and “nothing in the record indicate[d] that . . . any
significant portion of the aid expended . . . will end up flowing to religious education.” Id. at 488. Davey
is much more like Zelman than Witters, because if Davey prevailed, Washington probably would have to
fund more than a handful of sectarian schools, and, moreover, a significant portion of the aid would go to
purely sectarian education. That the government may provide substantial funding to education of a purely
sectarian nature through a generally available funding program was not established in Witters but rather in
Zelman.
27
Both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor were in the Zelman majority.
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dissenting in Zelman. All of these Justices are still on the bench, and considering the
vigorous dissents incited in Zelman,28 there is reason to believe that these four Justices
still believe that states violate the Establishment Clause when they provide substantial
funding to religious instruction.
Furthermore, the Zelman majority expressed a view on the Establishment Clause
that diverges from the historical foundation of the Establishment Clause29 and the Court’s
core Establishment Clause precedent.30 Thus, the difference between Washington’s
exclusion of Davey being a state constitutional issue and an Establishment Clause issue
comes down to an interpretation of the Establishment Clause (that might be held by only
three sitting Justices) that is neither compelled by precedent nor close to how four sitting
Supreme Court Justices interpret the Establishment Clause.
This, of course, is not to say that the Zelman majority’s interpretation of the
Establishment Clause should not be binding law. As our system currently operates, a
majority vote on a given issue is enough to create binding law. This is true even if the
majority is a slim one, and even if the majority’s holding varies from precedent. Zelman
is therefore the law of the land despite the fact that the majority opinion differs sharply
from both the Court’s precedent and mainstream interpretations of the Establishment
Clause.
But accepting that Zelman is good law does not mean that the majority in Zelman
should have the power to demote what was recently a federal constitutional issue to a

28

See the dissenting opinions in Zelman. Id. at 684-729.
See Everson, 330 U.S. at 13 (“This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the First
Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles, had
the same objective and were intended to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on
religious liberty as the Virginia statute.”);
30
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
29
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mere state constitutional interest. Since Washington’s reason for excluding Davey is
very much in line with the Court’s Establishment Clause precedent and mainstream
interpretations of the Establishment Clause, Washington’s exclusion of Davey should be
understood in light of that precedent and in light of those mainstream interpretations.
3. The strength of the Establishment Clause could have been affected by
the Davey decision.
The Establishment Clause must be considered when a decision interpreting the
Free Exercise Clause to mean X could prevent the Court from interpreting the
Establishment Clause to mean Y. In Davey, this was the case, since had the Court held
that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from excluding religious
organizations from general funding programs, the Court then would not be able to hold
that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from indirectly funding religious
organizations. This relationship between the Clauses is evident by imagining what would
happen if, after deciding Davey, the Court were to decide that Zelman was the incorrect
interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
Returning to the law as it was before Zelman would be simple if the Court ruled in
Davey, as it did, that the Free Exercise Clause permits the government to discriminate on
the basis of religion in order to exclude religious organizations from funding programs.
In this case, the Court would simply have to overrule Zelman in order to return to the law
as it was before Zelman.
However, had the Court ruled in Davey that the Free Exercise Clause always
prohibits the government from discriminating on the basis of religion, as Jay Sekulow,31

31

Jay Sekulow is the American Center for Law Justice Chief Counsel; he argued before the Supreme Court
on behalf of Joshua Davey.
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urged in oral argument,32 the Court would have locked itself into a post-Zelman
Establishment Clause.
In demonstrating how an alternative ruling in Davey would have locked the Court
into a post-Zelman Establishment Clause, first it should be noted that in the funding
context the post- Employment Division v. Smith33 Free Exercise Clause and the preZelman Establishment Clause are contradictory. Since Smith prohibits the government
from formally discriminating against religious organizations,34 this free exercise
formulation applied to government funding means that the government may not deny an
organization generally available funding on the basis of the organization’s religious
affiliation. But, because the Burger Court held in Lemon v. Kurtzman35 that the
Establishment Clause prohibits the government from passing a law that could have the
effect of establishing religion,36 this formulation means that in many situations the
government must exclude religious organizations from generally available funding
schemes.37 Accordingly, the pre-Zelman Establishment Clause and the post-Smith Free
Exercise Clause mean that when the government makes funding available to the public,
the government may neither include religious organizations in the program, nor exclude
religious organizations from the program—that is, they stand for contradictory
propositions.
32

The oral argument can be found at http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/case/1631/audioresources.
494 U.S. 872.
34
Id. at 886 n.3 (“Just as we subject to the most exacting scrutiny laws that make classifications based on
race . . . so too we strictly scrutinize governmental classifications based on religion.”) (emphasis added).
35
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
36
See id. at 612 (holding that there are three conditions that a law must satisfy in order to be valid under the
Establishment Clause, and one of these conditions is that the “primary effect [of the law] must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion”).
37
See, e.g., Committee for Public Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793 (1973) (holding
that a statute providing benefits to all private schools, including religious schools, violated the
Establishment Clause because the “inevitable effect [of including religious schools in the program is] to aid
and advance those religious institutions”).
33
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Until recently, it appeared that this irreconcilable tension between the pre-Zelman
Establishment Clause and the post-Smith Free Exercise Clause meant that the Court could
not apply a post-Smith Free Exercise Clause to government funding cases. However,
over the past five years the Rehnquist Court radically modified the Burger Court’s
interpretation of the Establishment Clause by holding in Mitchell v. Helms38 that the
government may directly fund the secular activities of religious organizations39 and in
Zelman that the government may indirectly fund the religious activities of religious
organizations. Thus, under the Rehnquist Court’s modified Establishment Clause, the
government often may include religious organizations in funding programs. By
interpreting the Establishment Clause to mean that the government may include religious
organizations in funding programs, the Rehnquist Court reduced the tension between the
Religion Clauses. Now that the Establishment Clause question of whether the
government may include religious organizations in funding programs is in the
background, the new question has emerged of whether the post-Smith Free Exercise
Clause applies to funding.40

38

530 U.S. 793.
It should be noted that the status of this proposition is still unclear, as Mitchell was a plurality opinion.
40
A helpful, and interesting, way to visualize this relationship between the Religion Clauses is to consider
the artist M.C. Escher’s use of interlocking images. By interlocking images, Escher blurred the distinction
between foreground and background. A famous example of this is Escher’s Day and Night. For an image
of the lithograph, go to: http://www.fantasyarts.net/Sci_fi/day_and_night_escher.jpg. In that lithograph,
the white geese are visible in the foreground only if one sees the black geese as part of the background, and
the black geese are visible in the foreground only if one sees the white geese as part of the background.
This relationship between the black and white geese in Escher’s Day and Night is analogous to the
relationship between the Burger Court’s post-Lemon Establishment Clause and the Rehnquist Court’s postSmith Free Exercise Clause. When the Burger Court’s Establishment Clause was in the foreground, the
post-Smith Free Exercise Clause could not be fully seen in government funding cases. However, as the
Rehnquist Court modified the Establishment Clause, the post-Smith Free Exercise Clause has been brought
into focus, much the way that Escher’s black birds are fully visible only after the white birds form the
background. Now that the Establishment Clause question of whether the government may include
religious organizations in funding programs is in the background, the new question has emerged in the
foreground: Does the Free Exercise Clause require the government to include religious organizations in
generally available funding programs?
39
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That brings us back to Davey. If the Court had ruled in Davey that the Free
Exercise Clause always prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, even in funding
programs, such a ruling on the Free Clause would lock the Court into a post-Zelman
Establishment Clause, since the pre-Zelman Establishment Clause often permitted, and
indeed required, the government to discriminate on the basis of religion.41 In other
words, an alternative interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Davey would have
locked the Court into a post-Zelman Establishment Clause.
This is problematic as a matter of judicial integrity. If the Court is committed to a
post-Zelman Establishment Clause, the Court should make this commitment after being
briefed on and considering the merits of Zelman under the Establishment Clause—not
covertly through the backdoor of the Free Exercise Clause.42
This is troubling enough when the decision on the Free Exercise Clause commits
the Court to a relatively clear area of law under the Establishment Clause—the
constitutionality of the indirect funding of religious organizations. But this is particularly
troubling when a ruling on the free exercise question could clarify an unclear area of the
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence—the constitutionality of the direct funding
of religious organizations.
Even after Mitchell v. Helms,43 there is still some doubt as to whether the
government may fund the secular activities of religious organizations directly, and there
is great doubt as to whether the government may fund the religious activities of religious
41

See, e.g., Committee for Public Ed. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
This relationship is again illustrated nicely by M.C. Escher’s Day and Night. Since we cannot see the
black geese until the white geese merge into the background, this means that if we are committed to seeing
the black geese then we are also committed to not seeing the white geese. Likewise, if the Court is
committed to reading the Free Exercise Clause to mean that the government may not discriminate on the
basis of religion, this means that the Court is thereby committed to a post-Zelman Establishment Clause.
43
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
42
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organizations directly. However, if the Court had ruled in Davey that the Free Exercise
Clause prohibits the government from discriminating on the basis of religion in funding
programs, there would be no difference under the Free Exercise Clause between the
government excluding religious organizations from a funding program involving secular
activities and the government excluding religious organizations from a funding program
involving religious activities—both exclusions would be unconstitutional. Thus, if the
Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to mean that the government may never
discriminate on the basis of religion, then the Court would have to rule that not only may
the government directly fund the secular activities of religious organizations, but also that
the government may fund the religious activities of religious organizations directly.
Of course, such a rule would have great significance for the Faith-Based
Initiative. No longer would there be a question of whether faith-based organizations may
compete with secular organizations for state funding. Instead, every state would be
required to permit faith-based organization compete for funding. Moreover, because the
government would be prohibited from ever discriminating against a religious
organization, the permissibility of directly funding religious organizations might become
a mandate when directly funding religious organizations would best achieve the
government’s purpose in providing the funding. Thus, in situations where a religious
organization was clearly better at providing a given service, the government would be
compelled by the U.S. Constitution to select the religious organization to provide the
service, even if doing so required the government to fund religious activities.
These possibilities of church-state partnerships are certainly a long way from any
interpretation that the Court has given to the Establishment Clause. But such partnerships
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between government and religion are a logical outgrowth of an alternative ruling in
Davey under the Free Exercise Clause. In Davey, the Court could have radically
transformed the relationship between government and religion under the Establishment
Clause with an expansive reading of the Free Exercise Clause. If both the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause are to have equal value under the U.S. Constitution,
both Clauses must be considered in decisions in which the interpretation of one Clause
effectively will limit the range of interpretations that may be given to the other Clause.
Thus, both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause must be considered in
a discussion of Davey.
B. Analyzing Davey Under Both Religion Clauses
1. The Free Exercise Clause
In searching the Court’s precedent for what constitutes a free exercise violation,
the Davey Court found three categories of free exercise violations. One category of free
exercise violation arises when the government regulates religious exercise either through
a civil or criminal penalty.44 A second category of violation occurs when the government
denies a person the right to participate in the political affairs of a community on the basis
of religion.45 And a third category of violation arises when the government forces a
citizen “to choose between her religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”46
In Davey, the Court upheld Washington’s exclusion of Davey by distinguishing
Washington’s exclusion from these three categories of cases. As the Court succinctly put
it, Davey falls outside of these categories because Davey is a case where“[t]he State has
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merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.”47 Part I.B.1.a-c explains
why Washington’s exclusion does not fall into any of these three categories of free
exercise violations.
a. Category One
The first category of free exercise violation arises when the government regulates
religious belief or conduct48 either through a civil or criminal penalty. This category is
the heart of the Free Exercise Clause. While there has been some dispute as to whether
this category includes situations where the government inadvertently regulates a religious
exercise,49 or whether this category is limited to situations where the government either
purposely or formally discriminates against a particular religious practice,50 there is
widespread agreement that the Free Exercise Clause applies when the government
regulates religious exercise.
However, there is not widespread agreement as to whether this category includes
situations where the government excludes an individual from a funding scheme on the
basis of religion. There is good reason to believe that, for Free Exercise Clause purposes,
government regulation of conduct is different from government exclusion from funding.
This distinction is found in the Court’s interpretation of the text of the Free Exercise
Clause.
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The Court has interpreted this text to mean not only that the government may not
prohibit individuals from participating in a religious exercise, but also that the
government may not coerce individuals into participating or not participating in a
religious exercise.51 With prohibition and coercion as the free exercise criteria, the
distinction between government regulation and exclusion is obvious. When the
government regulates a religious practice, it will often prohibit or coerce a religious
exercise. However, when the government excludes an individual from public funding,
the government will rarely prohibit or coerce a religious exercise. This is elaborated
below.
i. Prohibition of religious exercise
In Lyng, the Court interpreted what it means to prohibit religious exercise under
the Free Exercise Clause. In that case, Native Americans in Northern California sought
to enjoin the United States Forest Service from building a road on a piece of publicly
owned land that Native Americans used for religious ceremonies.52 Turning to the facts,
the Court found that building the road would not prevent the Native Americans from
following their religious beliefs.53 While the government’s decision to build the road
might prevent the Native Americans from conducting ceremonies on that land, the Native
Americans could still conduct their ceremonies somewhere else. Indeed, the Court found
that “it seems less than certain that construction of the road will be so disruptive that it
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will doom their religion.”54 Accordingly, the Court held that the government did not
prohibit a religious exercise and, therefore, the government could build the road.55
Under the reasoning in Lyng, whether or not there is prohibition of a religious
exercise comes down to the relationship between a citizen’s desire to exercise a religious
practice and the citizen’s ability to participate in that practice. When the government’s
action is the essential link between the citizen’s desire and ability, the government may
not act in a way that could prevent the citizen from following her religious beliefs.
There was no essential link in Lyng because the government’s decision of whether or not
to build the road did not stand in between the Native Americans’ desire to practice their
religious beliefs and their ability to do so.
While the government’s use of its own property rarely is the essential link
between an individual’s desire and ability to participate in a religious exercise, there are
many situations where government regulation is the essential link. In Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,56 for example, the city of Hialeah prohibited the ritual
sacrifice of animals, which is required by the Santerian religion.57 Because of the
Hialeah statute, Santerians could not follow their religion.58 Thus, Hialeah’s ordinance
was the essential link between the desire of Santerians to follow their religion, and the
ability of Santerians to do so. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the statute violated the
Free Exercise Clause.
54
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When compared to the government’s use of its property and the government’s
regulation of a religious exercise, it is clear that the government’s exclusion of an
individual from a funding scheme is much more similar to the government’s use of its
property. Government funding is like government property—in both situations, the
government establishes how and when a given item will be used. Because people often
have a means of practicing their religions outside the premises of the government
property, as the Native Americans in Lyng did, the government rarely prohibits religious
exercise by deciding how to use its property, as the Court held in Lyng. Likewise,
because people often have a means of practicing their religions without using government
funding, the government rarely, if ever, prohibits religious exercise by excluding a person
from a funding program.
This is clear in Davey. Based on the facts, it appears that despite Washington’s
exclusion of Davey from the Promise Scholarship, Davey still was able to study theology
from a devotional perspective at a religious college.59 Of course, without the Promise
Scholarship Davey might have had to pay for his studies. But Davey had that choice.
Since Davey had that choice, Washington did not provide the essential link between
Davey’s desire to study theology from a devotional perspective at a religious college and
Davey’s ability to do so. Thus, Washington did not prohibit Davey’s religious exercise.
ii. Coercion of religious exercise
Not only is prohibition difficult to find when the government excludes a citizen
from a funding scheme, coercion is also. As Judge McConnell has noted, there are two
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types of coercion—direct coercion and indirect coercion.60 He explains, “’Direct’
coercion is government action that forbids or compels certain behavior; ‘indirect’
coercion is government action that merely makes noncompliance more difficult or
expensive.”61 Direct coercion is the Lockean view of coercion;62 this is the narrower
version of coercion that the Court rejected in the Establishment Clause context, applying
instead the broader version—indirect coercion.63 However, the Court’s free exercise
case law clearly demonstrates that direct coercion is the standard for the Free Exercise
Clause. In Lyng, for example, the Court did not find governmental coercion because the
Native Americans were not compelled in any way. Indeed, they could perform their
rituals as they wanted—they just could not perform their rituals on government property.
Under this definition of coercion, it is difficult to imagine how the government
coerces an individual into participating or not participating in a religious exercise by
excluding the individual from a funding program. This is evident in Davey. Joshua
Davey sought Promise Scholarship funding, which was not available to every resident of
Washington. Instead, it was available only to those who satisfied four conditions. In
other words, only after satisfying those four conditions did a resident then have the
choice to receive the funding. Davey, however, did not satisfy the fourth condition.
Thus, Davey never had the choice to receive Washington’s funding. And without even
the choice to receive the funding, Davey could not have been compelled in any way.
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Sure, one could object, as Justice Scalia did in his dissent,64 that the condition on
government funding forms the baseline, and that therefore the withdrawal of funding
altered Davey’s choices. This might be right, depending, of course, on whether one
assumes that Davey’s choice to receive the funding arose when Washington created the
Promise Scholarship, or if, alternatively, Davey’s choice arose only after he satisfied the
four conditions. But even if Justice Scalia is right that Davey’s choice to receive the
funding arose when Washington created the Promise Scholarship, and that the exclusion
therefore altered Davey’s choices, this alteration of Davey’s choices did not coerce him
in the strict sense of the term. Davey still could study religion at any school he wanted—
he just could not do so with government funding. Thus, under the Court’s case law, there
was simply no compulsion and therefore no coercion.
b. Category Two
The second category of free exercise violations prohibits the government from
denying a citizen the right to participate in the political affairs of the community on the
basis of the citizen’s religious affiliation. Unlike the first category of free exercise
violation, the second category is not obvious from the text of the Free Exercise Clause
because a citizen may still exercise his religious beliefs freely when the government
denies the citizen the right to participate in the political affairs of the community. While
the text might not support this category, one can make a strong case for this category by
pointing to the structure of the Constitution—particularly, the role of the Free Exercise
Clause in sustaining a republican democracy. Understanding the relationship between
the Free Exercise Clause and republican democracy is important to understanding why
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Davey’s claim does not fall within this category of free exercise violations. A helpful
starting point in reaching this understanding is the Court’s plurality opinion in McDaniel
v. Paty.65
The dispute in McDaniel arose after Tennessee disqualified a minister, Paul
McDaniel, from serving as a delegate to the Tennessee constitutional convention by
enforcing a Tennessee statute prohibiting ministers from serving as delegates. Although
there was disagreement in the Court as to what constitutional provision Tennessee’s
statute violated, the eight Justices participating in the decision agreed that the statute was
unconstitutional.
As to whether the statute violated the Free Exercise Clause, the case presented a
problem for the Court because Tennessee did not regulate McDaniel’s exercise of his
religious beliefs through a civil or a criminal penalty. Indeed, McDaniel was free to
exercise his religious beliefs as he wished. Accordingly, McDaniel’s religious exercise
was neither prohibited nor coerced, and his claim, therefore, did not fall under category
one. Nonetheless, the Court found something troubling about Tennessee’s decision to
deprive McDaniel of the right to hold office on the basis of his religion affiliation. It was
this conditional relationship between political participation and religious affiliation that
made the statute unconstitutional despite the absence of a civil or criminal penalty on
McDaniel’s religious exercise.
Writing for himself and three other Justices, Chief Justice Burger explained that
there were two rights at stake in McDaniel. One, McDaniel had a constitutional right to
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exercise his religious beliefs under the U.S. Constitution.66 Two, McDaniel had a
statutory right to seek and hold office under Tennessee law.67 According to Chief Justice
Burger, Tennessee violated the Free Exercise Clause by “condition[ing] the exercise of
one on the surrender of the other.”68
Although Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred only in the judgment, they
expressed agreement with most of the plurality’s reasoning.69 Justice Brennan stated that
Tennessee’s law was unconstitutional because “[i]t establishes a religious classification .
. . . governing the eligibility for office.”70 Because the statute created a connection
between religious affiliation and political participation, Justices Brennan and Marshall
found the statute very similar to a test oath.71 Due to this similarity, they concluded that
the statute violated the Free Exercise Clause.72
As made clear in both of these opinions in McDaniel, the constitutional flaw in
Tennessee’s statute was the relationship it established between political participation and
religious affiliation. Thus, McDaniel does not mean that all government discrimination
on the basis of religion violates the Free Exercise Clause. To the contrary, the case
means only that government discrimination on the basis of religion that affects political
participation violates the Free Exercise Clause. This distinction between religious
discrimination that affects political participation and religious discrimination that does
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not affect political participation rests on two Free Exercise Clause axioms. One, the Free
Exercise Clause does not require equality between religion and non-religion. Two, the
Free Exercise Clause protects the political process from religious discrimination.
i. Equality and the Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause does not require equality between religion and nonreligion. In fact, in many instances the Clause requires inequality between religion and
non-religion. This non-equality component of the Free Exercise Clause is highlighted by
contrasting the Free Exercise Clause with the Equal Protection Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause commands the government to protect all people
equally. The Court has interpreted this to mean that the government may distinguish
citizens on the basis of an attribute only if there is reason to think that the given attribute
distinguishes people. In other words, the government must treat similarly situated people
equally. Thus, if x factor does not make people dissimilar, then the government may not
discriminate on the basis of x. For example, since we presume that race does not by
itself make people dissimilar, the government may not discriminate on the basis of race
unless it is an exceptional circumstance.
By contrast, the Free Exercise Clause limits the power of the government to
prohibit one thing in particular—religious exercise. By limiting the power of government
to prohibit religious exercise without limiting the power of government to prohibit other
practices, the Clause distinguishes religious exercise from non-religious exercise. In
making this distinction, the Clause asserts that religion is different from non-religion.
Accordingly, people who hold certain religious beliefs must at times be treated
differently from people who do not hold those religious beliefs. So while the Equal
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Protection Clause requires the government to treat similarly situated people equally, the
Free Exercise Clause requires the government to treat religious believers differently.73
This difference between the Equal Protection Clause and the Free Exercise Clause
is discussed in Judge McConnell’s critique of Smith.74 According to Judge McConnell, a
primary difference between the Clauses is that the Equal Protection Clause is
assimilationist while the Free Exercise Clause is counter-assimilationist. In requiring
equality, the Equal Protection Clause aims to assimilate and integrate people who are
fundamentally alike.75 The Free Exercise Clause, however, is counter-assimiliationist in
that it “allow[s] individuals of different religious faiths to maintain their differences.”76
Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, which presumes that people are generally the same,
the Free Exercise Clause presumes that “people of different religious convictions are
different.”77
This explains why Washington did not violate the Free Exercise Clause by
denying Davey the Promise Scholarship on the basis of his religious affiliation.
Washington made the decision that the Promise Scholarship should be limited to students
who use the Scholarship for secular education. Washington’s decision is entirely
compatible with the Free Exercise Clause because the decision rests on the premise that
religious education is different from secular education.
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While this non-equality component of the Free Exercise Clause explains why
states may discriminate on the basis of religion, it does not explain the McDaniel
decision. If the Free Exercise Clause permits and at times requires discrimination on the
basis of religion, why was Tennessee’s statute unconstitutional?
ii. Republicanism and the Free Exercise Clause
Although the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the government from treating
religion and non-religion differently, the Clause does prohibit the government from
basing an individual’s political standing on the individual’s religious beliefs. This is
made clear by examining the relationship between the Clause and republicanism.
A central purpose of the Clause is to protect our political system. This argument
is advanced in Professor David Richards’ book “Toleration and the Constitution.”78 In
analyzing the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, Richards discusses the philosophical
and political context from which the Clause emerged.79 Richards shows how the
Framers viewed religious liberty as essential to republicanism. Drawing from the
writing of Pierre Bayle, who argued for religious toleration in France,80 and John Locke,
who argued that there is a natural right of freedom of conscience,81 the Framers believed
that a republican form of government would survive only by protecting religious exercise
from government intervention, thereby protecting the voice of the people.82
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An excellent example of the relationship between republicanism and religious
liberty is found in Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.83 In that statute,
Jefferson refers to religious liberty in much the way that Locke did—as an inalienable
right. Indeed, according to Richards, “Jefferson appears to have drafted the statute after a
close study of Locke.”84 Jefferson went even further than Locke—in Jefferon’s words,
“where [Locke] stopped short, we may go on.”85 While Locke urged for an inalienable
right to religious freedom, which would include only a right to practice one’s religious
beliefs free from government intervention, Jefferson argued that in a free society people
must be free from any form of religious qualification for civil rights.86 As one Jefferson
historian writes, Jefferson believed that “[o]ur civil rights have no bearing on our
religious opinions.”87 So, just as “[o]pinions in physics and geometry do not incapacitate
one for any public duty or office, nor should opinions in religion.”88
Madison’s Remonstrance also draws from Locke’s writing on human reason and
its relationship to political decisionmaking. Of course, Madison’s Remonstrance is most
famous for its articulation of the taxpayer’s conscience. But the Remonstrance also
provides a vivid portrait of what it means to live in a republican democracy. In the
Remonstrance, Madison claims that freedom means that citizens have the power to form
conclusions on the basis of their own beliefs—in his words, “the opinions of men,
depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds, cannot follow the
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dictates of other men.”89 Because free men must be free to follow their own beliefs and
not the beliefs of others, religious believers “cannot deny an equal freedom to those
whose minds have not yielded to the evidence which has convinced [religious
believers].”90 By the same reasoning, non-religious believers cannot deny an equal
freedom to religious believers.
The relationship between religious freedom and political freedom reveals how the
Free Exercise Clause furthers a republican democracy. In a republican democracy, our
freedom is expressed in our beliefs, and our beliefs are expressed in our representatives.
Accordingly, if our representatives are limited to those individuals who hold certain
views, the range of our freedom is circumscribed. Therefore, in order to create a robust
republican democracy—a system whereby our representatives truly reflect our beliefs—
we must be free to elect whomever we want to elect.
This explains why the Free Exercise Clause prohibits states from conditioning
political participation on religious affiliation. If religious citizens cannot elect politicians
of their faith, the beliefs held by these citizens are underrepresented. The beliefs of other
citizens are effectively imposed on them. And these religious citizens are thereby less
free than non-religious citizens. For example, when Tennessee denied a minister the
right to serve as a delegate to the constitutional convention, those residents of Tennessee
who share the minister’s beliefs were denied a voice in the constitutional convention. A
truly representative democracy requires the inclusion of their voices.
However, there is no denial of political representation when a state denies
educational benefits on the basis of religious affiliation. Sure, those denied funding must
89
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pay more than others for education. But this denial of funding does not bear on political
representation. Indeed, those denied funding are perfectly free to elect representatives
who can either abolish the scholarship program altogether or amend the program so as to
include those using the scholarship for religious education.
That there is no denial of political representation in a denial of educational
funding is illustrated in Davey. Despite being denied the Promise Scholarship, Joshua
Davey could have elected representatives to change the program, or better yet, he could
have run for a Washington government position. There was simply no denial of political
representation in his exclusion from the Promise Scholarship. Thus, Davey’s claim did
not fall under the second category of free exercise violation.
c. Category Three
Under this third category, states may not force citizens to choose between their
religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit. To understand why Davey’s claim
did not fall under this third category, it is important to discuss Sherbert v. Verner,91 the
case that generated this category, and to appreciate two fundamental differences between
Davey’s claim and the claim at issue in Sherbert.
In Sherbert, the Court declared that the government violates the Free Exercise
Clause when it forces a citizen to choose between a government benefit and her religious
practice. Sherbert arose after Ms. Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist, was fired from her
job for refusing to work on Saturdays, as required by her religion.92 Ms. Sherbert then
sought unemployment compensation, which she could receive under South Carolina law
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only if her unemployment was involuntary.93 South Carolina refused to provide
compensation because, according to the South Carolina Employment Security
Commission, Ms. Sherbert’s termination was voluntary.94 The Court ruled that, by
forcing Ms. Sherbert to choose between following her religious beliefs but forfeiting her
unemployment compensation on the one hand, and violating her religious beliefs but
preserving her eligibility for unemployment compensation on the other hand, South
Carolina imposed “the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a
fine.”95 Since a fine on a religious exercise undoubtedly would have violated the Free
Exercise Clause, the Court found no reason to hold differently in Sherbert.96
At first glance, Sherbert appears to stand for the proposition that the government
may never discriminate against religion in a funding scheme. In two ways, however, the
Sherbert holding is much narrower than that general proposition. One, Sherbert is
limited to situations in which the government funding is conditioned on the nonperformance of an act that a citizen is compelled to perform by her faith. Two, Sherbert
applies only when the government discriminates individually.
i. Compulsion by faith as a necessary condition
As the Court explained in Davey, Sherbert means that the government may not
force citizens “to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government
benefit.”97 This is an either/or situation: the citizen can either follow her faith or receive
the government benefit. Thus, this choice between following a religious mandate and
receiving government funding arises only in situations in which a citizen is compelled to
93
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perform an act by her religion, and the government conditions funding on nonperformance of that religiously compelled act. Accordingly, compulsion by faith is a
necessary condition under Sherbert.
Davey’s claim does not fall under this third category because he did not show
that he was compelled by his faith to pursue a degree in theology. Although Davey might
have sincerely believed that he had a calling to pursue a degree in theology from a
religious school, Davey was probably not compelled by his faith to do so. In fact, there is
strong evidence that Davey was not compelled in that Davey eventually decided not to
pursue a career in the ministry and instead decided to pursue a law degree at Harvard
Law School.98 Thus, a more accurate description of his calling is that he felt impelled to
pursue a degree in theology—that is, his beliefs inspired him to pursue the degree.
Because he was impelled rather than compelled, Davey could use the Promise
Scholarship for secular education without violating his religious beliefs. Therefore,
Davey did not have to choose between following his religion and receiving government
funds.
By contrast, Ms. Sherbert was not impelled. She was truly compelled—i.e., her
interpretation of her religious text forbad her from working on Saturday. Because Ms.
Sherbert would have directly violated a textual command in her faith by working on
Saturday, Ms. Sherbert was presented with an either/or situation. She could either follow
her religion and not receive government funds, or should could violate her religion and
receive government funds. This is the type of situation that the Free Exercise Clause
prohibits the government from creating.
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ii. Individualized v. generally applicable laws
Even assuming that Davey’s study of religion was just as compelled by his faith
as was Ms. Sherbert’s sabbatarian observance (which, as described above, is a generous
and probably false assumption), Davey’s claim does not fall under this third category of
free exercise violations. As Justice Scalia explained for the majority of the Court in
Employment Division v. Smith,99 this category of free exercise violations is limited to
instances in which the government discriminates individually.100 Justice Scalia’s narrow
reading of this category is supported by how the Court applied the Sherbert ruling in
subsequent cases.
After Sherbert, the Court typically upheld religion-neutral and generally
applicable laws under the Free Exercise Clause, even when they substantially burdened
an individual’s religious exercise.101 Based on these cases, Justice Scalia noted in Smith
that Sherbert and its progeny of unemployment compensation cases102 were the
exceptions to this rule.103 Justice Scalia explained that a different rule applied in these
unemployment compensation cases because “their eligibility criteria invite consideration
of the particular circumstances behind an applicant's unemployment.”104 And when the
government considers one person’s reasons for being unemployed, there is a risk that the
government will evaluate the worthiness of that person’s religious beliefs.
That is precisely what happened to Ms. Sherbert. When the South Carolina
Employment Security Commission asked Ms. Sherbert why she was fired, and Ms.
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Sherbert said that her religion forbad her from going to work, the government assessed
her reason for not going to work. By refusing to accept her reason, the government
implicitly rejected her particular religious beliefs. The government effectively told her
that her religious reason was not a good reason.
The individualized nature of this process reveals why the unemployment cases
raise a unique problem under the Free Exercise Clause. When the government has the
power to grant benefits on the basis of whether a claimant’s particular religious reason is
a good reason, there is a serious risk that the government will accord some religious
beliefs greater value than others. This is problematic because when the government
grants benefits to citizens on the basis of their religious beliefs, a citizen’s status in the
political community is determined by her religious beliefs. For example, if the
government had the power to determine whether a person’s particular religious reason for
missing work is a good reason, a government official who sympathized with Hindus but
not Roman Catholics might award benefits to an individual fired for refusing to work in a
slaughterhouse, but not to an individual fired for refusing to perform abortions. In this
case, the Hindu would have a greater standing in the community than the Roman
Catholic. And, as discussed earlier, the government’s conditioning of political standing
on religious beliefs violates a central aim of the Religion Clauses—to sustain a
democratic republic.105
As opposed to individualized discrimination against religion, discrimination
against religion via a generally applicable law presents a minimal threat to religious
liberty because it eliminates the possibility of the government evaluating an individual’s
religious beliefs. When the government excludes all religious callings from a generally
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available funding program, the government effectively tells all of its citizens that their
religious beliefs will not be assessed as good or bad by the government. This
consequently preserves the political equality of citizens. All citizens may exercise their
religious beliefs freely, unconcerned that the government will deprive them of a
government benefit that a follower of a more popular faith is awarded.
Because Washington’s criteria were applicable to all students seeking the Promise
Scholarship benefits, Joshua Davey could not have been concerned that he was deprived
of a benefit that a follower of a different faith received. That is not to say that losing the
scholarship benefits did not burden Davey. Clearly, Washington financially burdened
Davey by taking money away from him. And surely, this financial burden was
exacerbated by any metaphysical burden Davey experienced as a result of connecting his
withdrawn benefits to the fact that he was intensely religious. However, because
Washington applied its exclusion of religion on a generalized basis, Davey could not
have been reasonably concerned that Washington would have funded, say, a Jewish
student’s rabbinical studies. To the contrary, Davey lost his benefits knowing that every
person of every faith in the State of Washington would not receive Promise Scholarship
benefits to study theology from a devotional perspective. He could feel confident that the
State of Washington assigned the same monetary value to his interest in becoming a
Pastor as the State assigned to someone else’s interest in becoming a Priest or a Rabbi.
For purposes of the Free Exercise Clause, Davey’s experience is a world away from that
of Ms. Sherbert, who, as she stood on line for unemployment compensation, had reason
to worry that the person behind her could receive benefits by citing a religious reason for
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missing work that was more popular with the South Carolina Employment Security
Commission.
In light of the constitutional differences between discriminatory regulation and
funding, the constitutional differences between denying a citizen funding and political
participation, and the constitutional differences between individualized and generalized
discriminatory funding, the Court did not apply strict scrutiny to Washington’s exclusion.
Although the Court did not expressly state what standard of review it applied, the Court
clearly stated that the presumption of unconstitutionality normally applied to free
exercise violations did not apply to Davey’s claim.106 Instead, a lower standard
applied.107 Parts II.B explores why Washington prevailed under this lower standard.
B. The Establishment Clause
The Davey Court found that Washington satisfied the lower standard of review
because Washington had a substantial interest in not funding religious instruction.108
Although the Court did not analyze the nature of this interest—that is, beyond noting the
tradition in many states of not funding the clergy—it seems that based on the history of
the Religion Clauses and the Court’s case law there are two powerful arguments
underlying the Court’s finding of a substantial interest. One, the funding of religions
organizations imposes a burden on the taxpayer’s conscience. Two, such funding
increases the likelihood of political division and friction.
1. The conscientious burden
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James Madison famously explained the conscientious burden in his Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.109 In the Remonstrance, Madison
convinced Virginia not to use tax dollars to fund Christian teachers because of the burden
it would impose on the taxpayer’s conscience. Thomas Jefferson similarly claimed in his
Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom that “to compel a man to furnish contributions of
money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical.”110
As Jefferson proudly explained, Virginia’s decision not to fund religious instruction
contributed to the liberation of the human mind after centuries of being “held in vassalage
by kings, priests and nobles.”111 For this reason, he claimed that Virginia “produced the
first legislature who has had the courage to declare that the reason of man may be trusted
with the formation of his own opinions.”112
Although Madison’s and Jefferson’s writings are undoubtedly remarkable, both as
philosophical and political works, there is reason to question how they can be applied by
courts in constitutional adjudication. After all, the principal burden that Jefferson and
Madison described was a metaphysical burden—indeed, it is difficult to see how
taxpayers are burdened in any physical way by paying taxes that are later used by the
legislature for religious instruction. Even if a taxpayer opposes the funding of religious
organizations and therefore finds it objectionable that her government uses her tax dollars
to fund religious organizations, the resulting burden on her conscience, if it can be said to
exist, is quite abstract and unquantifiable.
109
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The conscientious burden was abstract and unquantifiable then; it is anachronistic
now. In the modern welfare state, where the federal government uses tax dollars to
regulate and fund many programs involving controversial issues, every taxpayer can
articulate some conscientious burden. This burden is not limited to the religious
taxpayer; the secular pacifist, the secular pro-lifer, and the secular environmentalist might
all be conscientiously burdened by their government’s funding of weapons, abortion, and
oil production. As Professors Lupu and Tuttle note in their article on the Zelman
decision, “There is no principled reason why the consciences of taxpayers with respect to
religious matters should enjoy constitutional preference over the consciences of taxpayers
with respect to nonreligious matters, such as support for weapons, sex education, or
art.”113
The Court’s rejection of the taxpayer’s conscience argument has infuriated some
Justices. Dissenting in Zelman, Justice Souter cited Madison’s reasoning in a vigorous
argument against the indirect funding of religious education.114 Justice Souter explained
that Madison’s reasoning regarding the taxpayer’s conscience applies to modern day
America; indeed, he exclaimed, because we live in a plural state, and because religious
beliefs invariably clash, government sponsored religious education creates as much of a
conscientious a burden as ever.115
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While Justice Souter is surely right that government funding of religious might
burden the consciences of some taxpayers, he is probably wrong in claiming that federal
courts should invalidate state funding programs because of this burden. In a world where
consequences matter more than theories, it does not make sense for the theoretical burden
of state funding of religion to prevail under the Establishment Clause.
But, saying that states do not have an obligation to protect taxpayers from this
burden is not the same as saying that states do not have an interest in providing protection
from the burden. This distinction between constitutionally created mandates and
legitimate policy interests is an important one—and, unfortunately, a distinction that has
been overlooked in much of the commentary on Davey. Drawing on this distinction,
courts should note that even if they should not invalidate state funding programs because
of this burden, states might have an interest in not funding religious organizations so that
they can protect their taxpayers from this burden. So, even if the Establishment Clause
does not require the states to recognize this interest, the Davey Court properly recognized
the interests that states have in not funding religious education.
How strong was this interest in Davey? As many Justices noted in oral
argument,116 Washington’s interest was probably not very strong, since Joshua Davey
could have declared a major in business and then taken all of his theology classes under
the scholarship condition; indeed, Washington did not prohibit him from taking theology
class but only in majoring in theology. But, even if this interest in not funding religious
education was not strong, it is an interest that is part of this country’s tradition, and,
moreover, it is an interest at the foundation of the Establishment Clause. Thus, while this
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interest might not be very strong, it is, nonetheless, an interest of constitutional
dimensions, and the Court properly recognized it as such.
However, even if a state were to apply this interest in a more rigorous way than
Washington applied it in the Promise Scholarship, it would be a stretch to characterize
this interest as substantial. After all, as noted above, the burden is merely a metaphysical
one, and metaphysical burdens have not made for strong arguments in federal courts.117
Moreover, it would not make sense for the taxpayer’s conscientious interest to trump the
more particularized conscientious interest that citizens have in being treated equally.
Indeed, if it can said that a person experiences a conscientious burden resulting from the
government’s funding of religious education even when the funding does not directly
affect her, it surely can be said that a person experiences a more pernicious conscientious
burden when the government takes money away from a person because of her religious
affiliation. Furthermore, it does not make sense for the taxpayer’s conscience to trump
the economic interest that citizens like Joshua Davey have in receiving government
funding that they have qualified for based on religion-neutral criteria. To defeat this
concrete and practical interest that religious citizens have in receiving government
funding, states must provide a similarly concrete and practical interest—such as the
interest that states have in preventing political division and friction.
2. Political division and friction
In addition to expressing concern about the government’s funding of religion
leading to a conscientious burden on taxpayers, Madison explained in the Remonstrance
that political division would result from such funding. While the Remonstrance is
117
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probably most famous for its articulation of the taxpayer’s conscience, it must be
remembered that the Remonstrance was not merely an inquiry into metaphysical burdens;
it was much more than that; indeed, it was a legal argument supported by both theoretical
and practical reasoning. The practical element of the argument focused on the
disharmony that would result from Virginia’s funding of religious instruction. Such
funding, Madison warned, would “destroy . . . moderation and harmony” and was,
therefore, an “enemy to the public quiet.”118
Jefferson also made this link between political unity and the government’s refusal
to fund religious instruction. In a letter to Dr. Thomas Cooper, Jefferson discussed the
role of religion in his prized university, the University of Virginia.119 After noting that
there is no divinity professor at the University, and that Jefferson’s decision not to hire a
divinity professor has led many to question whether the University opposes religion,
Jefferson explains how he defended his decision to the Virginia legislature.120 Jefferson
writes to Dr. Thomas Cooper that the letter to the legislature began by “stating the
constitutional reasons against a public establishment of any religious instruction,”121 and
then proceeded to argue that, besides the constitutional concerns, it is expedient not to
provide religious instruction because “by bringing the sects together, and mixing them
with the mass of other students, we shall soften their asperities, liberalize and neutralize
their prejudices, and make the general religion a religion of peace, reason, and
morality.”122
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This link between government funding and political friction has not gone
unnoticed by the Court. On many occasions, the Court has found that avoiding political
friction is a reason for states not to fund religious organizations.123 Perhaps most
significantly, the Court focused on this link in its foundational case of Lemon v.
Kurtzman,124 where, after stating that government acts that excessively entangle
government and religion are unconstitutional, the Court explained that state programs
with a “divisive political potential” are presumptively unconstitutional because of their
tendency in creating such impermissible entanglement.125
Recently, Justice Breyer has suggested that preventing political division is the
central purpose of the Religion Clauses. In Zelman, he thought that the Court should
have invalidated Ohio’s voucher program because, despite the apparent benefits to lowincome students, the fact that most of the money went to religious schools made the
program “potentially harmful to the nation’s social fabric.”126 Justice Breyer looked
again to political divisiveness in his critical concurrence in one of the recent Ten
Commandment cases. After noting that a basic purpose of the Religion Clauses was to
“avoid that divisiveness based on religion that promotes social conflict,”127 Justice Breyer
upheld the Texas display because forcing its removal might “create the very kind of
religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”128
Several Justices have questioned the role that the political divisiveness factor
should play in the adjudication of disputes in federal courts. In Zelman, the majority
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responded to Justice Breyer’s invocation of the political divisiveness principle in his
dissent by questioning “what sort of principle Justice Breyer [had] in mind, considering
that the program had ignited no ‘divisiveness’ or ‘strife’ other than this litigation.”129
Since the protection of people from political division sounds like a policy matter, not a
juridical matter, the Court expressed concern as to “where Justice Breyer would locate
[the] presumed authority to deprive Cleveland residents of a program that they have
chosen but that we subjectively find ‘divisive.’”130 This concern is particularly great in a
federal court, where the authority to hear and adjudicate issues is constitutionally
circumscribed.
Considering the federal judiciary’s circumscribed authority, the majority correctly
rejected Justice Breyer’s reasoning in Zelman. It does not make sense for federal courts
to adjudicate the constitutionality of state laws according to whether or not they might
create political friction. Surely, if courts were charged with the duty of preventing
political friction, courts would get entangled in local political feuds involving issues that
federal courts cannot fully appreciate. Moreover, resolving disputes under the criterion
of political divisiveness will make for fuzzy, and, arguably, arbitrary adjudication. For
example, who is to say what will lead to friction? Since any church-state issue that gets
to a court is going to be contentious and sectarian—after all, litigation is contentious and
church-state issues are religious—either party can argue that the court’s ruling for the
other party will create acrimony along religious lines, and thus either party can formulate
a political division argument for why the Court should rule in her favor. As the political
divisiveness criterion does not make for a sharp or reliable juridical tool, the political
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divisiveness of a program involving the funding of religious organizations should not
determine the constitutionality of the program.
But, again, that federal courts should not invalidate government acts that touch on
religious matters merely because of their political divisiveness does not mean that states
do not have a cognizable interest in avoiding political division by refusing to fund
religious education. One of the primary duties of the state government is to protect
citizens. And this is a duty that states are well-equipped to perform. So federal courts
should defer to state decisions as to whether a particular program will create political
conflict. Thus, by pointing to specific facts indicating that the government’s funding of
religious organizations will not only burden the consciences of many taxpayers but will
also divide the people, a state should be able to prove that it has a substantial interest in
not funding religious education.
Under this formulation, the Davey outcome was right. Although Washington did
not justify its exclusion of Davey on this basis, Washington could have established how
funding students wishing to study religion would have created division among
Washington residents. Since there do not appear to be any colleges or universities in
Washington offering programs for students seeking to become a Rabbi131 or an Imam132
or a Brahmin,133 it is unlikely that Jews, Muslims, or Hindus would be able to use the
Promise Scholarship benefits to study their respective faiths from a devotional
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perspective. While there are not any schools offering these Jewish, Islamic, or Hindu
instruction, there are several colleges and universities offering Christian instruction.134
Despite their small populations, it is likely that some Jews, Muslims, or Hindus would be
eligible for the Promise Scholarship, and would want to use the funds to study their own
religious backgrounds from a devotional perspective.135 But, because of Washington’s
requirement that the students use the funds in the state, and because there are no schools
in Washington offering majors in Jewish, Islamic, or Hindu studies, no Jewish, Muslim,
or Hindu students would be able to study their religious backgrounds from a devotional
perspective with scholarship funds. Accordingly, only those students seeking to study
Christianity from a devotional perspective would be able to use state funds to do so. By
creating the conditions that allowed only Christians to study their religion with
government funds, Washington could have increased the friction among different
religious groups. Thus, Washington had a strong interest in excluding the study of
religion from a devotional perspective from the Promise Scholarship.
II. ASSUAGING CONCERNS
Many commentators have expressed concern about the discretion that the Davey
Court granted the states in refusing to fund religious organization. There are three
reasons why there should not be too much concern. One, because the Framers intended,
and the public originally understood, the Religion Clauses to be a federalist directive,
134
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federal courts achieve some of the desirable effects of originalism—namely, political
accountability and judicial consistency136 —by deferring to the states on close churchstate questions. Two, because states have different needs and interests at stake in
partnering with religious organizations, federal courts further state policymaking by
granting states discretion to experiment in developing church-state policies. Three,
because decentralization might protect religious liberty and autonomy, federal courts
might further the central goals of the Free Exercise Clause by refusing to hold states to a
restrictive, monolithic standard.
A. The Religion Clauses as a Federalist Directive
Noting that the text of the Religion Clauses only speaks to the powers of
Congress, and that many states had officially established churches when the Framers
adopted the First Amendment, many eminent scholars have concluded that the Framers
intended the Religion Clauses to prevent only the federal government from passing laws
respecting the establishment of religion and prohibiting the free exercise of religion.137
Thus, some argue, the Religion Clauses are best understood as a federalist directive.
If the Religion Clauses are read as a federalist directive, the Establishment Clause
prohibits the means that the federal government employs, not the ends. In other words,
the Establishment Clause prohibits the federal government from affecting the status of
religion in the states. This means that the federal government may not establish or
disestablish religion. And if one accepts that the Establishment Clause prohibits the
136
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federal government from both establishing and disestablishing religion, then the Court’s
incorporation of the Establishment Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment was in
itself a violation of the Establishment Clause. Indeed, the Court cannot read the Due
Process Clause to require the state disestablishment of religion when forcing states to
disestablish religion violates the Establishment Clause—that is, unless one subscribes to a
Godelian view of constitutional interpretation.138 But if one insists on complete
consistency within the constitutional system, disincorporation of the Establishment
Clause is necessary. For this reason, some commentators and Justices today maintain
that although the Court might have been right in incorporating the Free Exercise
Clause,139 the Establishment Clause should not have been incorporated.140
The strength of these disincorporationist arguments might be questioned. After
all, the original intent of the Framers in adopting the Religion Clauses is certainly less
relevant after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the argument that
it is illogical to incorporate the Establishment Clause assumes that there is no individual
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liberty right in the Establishment Clause. This assumption is probably false. As Justice
Brennan keenly observed in his concurring opinion in Abbington School District v.
Schempp,141 “The fallacy in this contention is that it underestimates the role of the
Establishment Clause as a coguarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious
liberty.”142 Because the Establishment Clause guarantees liberty along with the Free
Exercise Clause, it does not make sense to apply only one Clause to the states. Most
importantly, at least as a practical matter, the argument that the Court erroneously
incorporated the Establishment Clause is irrelevant because too much time has passed;
indeed, it is unlikely that the Court will overrule its decision to incorporate the
Establishment Clause after more than 50 years of uninterrupted application to the
states.143
Importantly, however, one need not believe in disincorporating the Establishment
Clause to believe that the federalist background of the Religion Clause should inform the
federal judiciary’s adjudication of church-state issues. Since the Religion Clauses were
understood originally as a federalist directive, and since there is reason to believe that the
Establishment Clause should continue to apply to the states, granting states broad
discretion in designing their own church-state relations in certain cases achieves the
systemic predictability and democratic accountability that some have argued are achieved
in an originalist jurisprudence. One such case when federal courts should grants states
this discretion is when there are strong state interests for both separating from and
partnering with religious organizations.

141

374 US 203 (1963).
Id. at 256.
143
The Court incorporated the Establishment Clause to the states in Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1 (1947).
142

48

B. State Needs and Interests
There are strong state interests for both separating from and partnering with
religious organizations when it comes to the provision of social services. Communities
of course vary greatly in religious, social, economic, and racial composition. To
determine how these characteristics relate to people’s views on church-state relations,
Professor Jelen of Illinois Benedictine College and Professor Wilcox of Georgetown
University had people from different backgrounds fill out questionnaires on various
church-state issues.144 They found that a person’s religious identity informs how one
views church-state issues.145 For example, they found that Roman Catholics are
significantly more likely than Jews to favor both aid to religious institutions and
protection of a Judeo-Christian heritage.146 In addition, they found that a person’s
education is related to one’s views on government aid to religion;147 according to the
study, greater levels of education make it more likely that a person will oppose
government aid to religion.148 They also found that people with higher incomes tend to
oppose government aid to religion.149 Race is also a factor;150 as compared to the white
respondents, “[b]oth African Americans and Hispanics [are] less likely to hold
separationist attitudes, and [are] considerably more likely to be accommodationists.”151
This study suggests that communities differing in religious, social, economic or
racial composition will differ in how their residents perceive government aid to religious
144
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organizations. For example, the study indicates that if a wealthy community wanted to
develop a K-12 voucher program,152 the majority of the community would want to
prevent religious schools from participating.
A wealthy community should have the discretion to exclude religious schools
from the program because denying the community this discretion is inconsistent with our
federalist scheme. Just as states may provide more speech protection than the Free
Speech Clause requires,153 more privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment
mandates,154 and a more searching rational basis review than the Due Process Clause
demands,155 states should be able to erect a higher wall between church and state than the
U.S. Constitution requires.156 Thus, a community should be able to exclude religious
schools from a voucher program.
However, it does not follow that because some communities may exclude
religious schools from a voucher program that all communities must. Just as denying one
community the power to exclude religious institutions from its voucher program is
inconsistent with our federalist scheme, denying another community the authority to
make sure its children are safe and educated is inconsistent with our conception of
liberty. Communities should be able to ensure that their children are safe. And many
parents in urban communities support voucher programs because they want their children
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to be safe.157 Communities should also be able to make sure that their children are
educated; indeed, as Justice Thomas noted in Zelman, “without education one can hardly
exercise the civic, political, and personal freedoms conferred by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”158 And many parents support voucher programs because they want to
improve their children’s education.159 Faced with crime and poor education in secular
schools, and safety and quality education in religious schools, children should be able to
jump the wall to the religious schools—even if doing so requires using tax dollars for
religious instruction. The Religion Clauses should not create such a high wall between
religion and non-religion so that overcoming this hurdle is impossible.
C. Decentralization and Religious Liberty
Not only might decentralization of authority over church-state relations achieve
originalist goals and promote social experimentation; it also might be an effective means
of guaranteeing religious liberty. Professor Richard C. Schragger makes this argument in
his paper on local government and religious liberty.160 He argues that when
governmental authority is dispersed, government is less able to control religion; indeed,
“political decentralization ensures that the national councils do not have a monopoly on
the power to regulate religion.”161 And when there is no monopoly on religion, religious
organizations are free to compete. This competition, in turn, “prevents any one sect from
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gaining political dominance in the whole.”162 Thus, decentralization guarantees religious
liberty, particularly for minority sects.
In addition, Schragger argues, decentralization makes it more difficult for
religious groups to control government because decentralization empowers local
governments. Schragger argues that when the federal courts or Congress make
exemptions for religious organization, they “undermin[e] an important institutional
location for the articulation of public norms and values.”163 By undermining local
institutions, federal courts and Congress weaken local government.164 And when local
government is weakened, religious organizations are consequently in a better position to
control government, which of course means that the risk of oppression of minority sects
is greater.165 Thus, decentralization makes the local government a formidable guardian of
religious liberty.
III. CREATING A NEW PARADIGM
A. Establishing the Davey Rule
The Court announced a new rule in Davey. That much is clear regardless of one’s
view on religious establishment or religious liberty. However, commentators disagree on
what the rule is. Thus far, two interpretations of the rule have appeared.
Professor Marci Hamilton has offered the broadest reading of the holding. In an
article analyzing the decision, she explains that in Davey “[t]he Court could not have
been clearer . . . [that] [i]n Free Exercise challenges, hostility to religion must be shown
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for strict scrutiny to apply.”166 She supports this interpretation of Davey by pointing to
the majority’s statement that Davey is not like Lukumi.167 She concludes that since
Lukumi, unlike Davey, involved animus against religion, the difference between the
outcomes in Davey and Lukumi is due to the fact that there was no animus in Davey.168
Thus, the Davey Court held that discrimination against religion is permissible under the
Free Exercise Clause so long as it is not motivated by animus.169
Contrary to her claim that the distinction between Davey and Lukumi rests on the
state’s motives for passing the law, the Court’s distinction between Davey and Lukumi
clearly rests on the burden imposed on the claimant. In fact, the Court could not have
been clearer about this. The Court explicitly stated that Davey was not like Lukumi
because Davey merely involved withdrawn funding whereas Lukumi involved criminal
sanctions.170 In making this distinction, the Court clearly expressed that Davey’s claim
did not fall into the first category of free exercise violation—the category that prohibits
the government from regulating on the basis of religion.
Under Professor Hamilton’s broad reading of the Davey ruling, however, this first
category would be narrowed to apply only when in regulating religious individuals or
organizations the government evinced hostility towards religion. This would mean that
the government could prohibit religious exercise so long as the government did not have
a bad motive in doing so. But this was not what the Court held in Davey. In fact, one can
be sure that had Washington enacted a law prohibiting the study of religion altogether,
166
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with or without state funding, the Court would have struck down that law even if
Washington expressed no animus in passing the law. Because Professor Hamilton’s
animus-rule is simply nowhere to be found in the opinion, and because her animus-rule is
at odds with the Court’s formulation in Smith171—and indeed would overrule some of the
Court’s free exercise case law172—her argument that the Davey opinion rests on motives
is therefore implausible.
On the other extreme are Professors Thomas Berg and Douglas Laycock who
believe that Davey can be plausibly read to apply only to the funding of the clergy.173 As
compared to Hamilton’s animus-only interpretation, there is plenty of evidence in the
opinion supporting this clergy-only interpretation. After all, the facts before the Court
involved the funding of Joshua Davey, a person seeking to become a Pastor. Moreover,
much of the Court’s reasoning can be applied only to the clergy. Indeed, the majority
opinion frequently cites the tradition of not funding the clergy as support for the
proposition that Washington had a substantial interest in excluding Davey. And the
majority frequently suggests that the Court’s inquiry was not whether states could refuse
to fund religious organizations altogether, but rather whether states could refuse to fund
the clergy.
However, this reading of Davey is not simply narrowed to the facts of the case;
the reading is much more unfaithful to the opinion than that; the reading ignores the core
doctrinal and policy issues before the Court. As a doctrinal matter, this interpretation is
unreasonably narrow, as it fails to account for the Court’s attempt to distinguish the
171
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withdrawal of funding from three categories of free exercise relations. If the Court was
interested in drawing a narrow exception for the funding of the clergy, there would be no
need to distinguish the withdrawal of funding from the three categories of free exercise
violations. Rather, the Court could have merely stated that, for historical reasons, the
funding of the clergy is different from the funding of religious organizations—then the
Court could have stopped the analysis there. But the Davey Court did not make this
distinction between religious organizations and the clergy. Instead, the Court made a
distinction between three categories of free exercise violation and the withdrawal of
funding. There is nothing in this distinction suggesting that it should or can apply only to
the clergy.
In addition, the Court did not indicate that the “play in the joints” between the
Religion Clauses is limited to the clergy. And, not only did the Court not expressly limit
the applicability of this principle, it would be odd if this flexibility did not refer to the
distinct relationship of religious exercise and establishment under the U.S. Constitution—
a relationship that applies to all relationships between religion and government—but,
instead, referred only to a special relationship between religious professionals and
government.
Furthermore, as Justice O’Connor noted in oral argument, the issue before the
Court implicated the policy decisions of the states. Indeed, the Justices and lawyers
discussed at length in oral argument how the decision would have an impact on K-12
voucher programs and the Blaine Amendments.174 Thus, reducing Davey to a case about
the funding of clergy simply misconstrues what was at stake in the decision.
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Based on the oral argument and the text of the opinion, it does not seem that
anyone who participated in the case viewed it as a case limited to the funding of the
clergy. Rather, it seems that everyone understood Davey to be a case about the funding
of religion. Accordingly, contrary to what Professors Berg and Laycock argue in their
article, the Court’s decision granting states discretion clearly extends to government
decisions beyond the funding of clergy.
As these different interpretations of Davey suggest, it is not clear what the Davey
rule is. To be sure, it is clear that the opinion does not make animus a necessary
condition for free exercise violations or apply only to the funding of clergy. But much
more than that is not clear. However, the majority’s reliance on the church-state
principles examined in this Article suggests that the rule is a composite of these
principles. Because the Court declared that strict scrutiny does not apply when the
government discriminates on the basis of religion in a generally available funding
program, and because the Court established that states have a cognizable interest under
the Establishment Clause in excluding religious organizations from generally available
funding programs, the rule from Davey can therefore be stated in these terms: A state
may discriminate on the basis of religion within a generally available funding program
that does not directly affect an individual’s ability to participate in the political
community only if the state’s religious classification relates to a cognizable
Establishment Clause interest.
Amendments because of their relationship to James G. Blaine’s proposed amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. In 1875, when Blaine was Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, he proposed an
amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibiting states from funding religious institutions. After Blaine’s
amendment failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate for ratification, many states
passed their own versions of the amendment. According to the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, there are
thirty-nine Blaine Amendments. See http://www.blaineamendments.org/states/states.htm.; see also PHILIP
HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (Harvard University Press, 2002).
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While I believe this formulation to be a faithful account of the decision, I do not
believe that it is ideal as a constitutional doctrine. For one, it does not provide the criteria
for identifying a cognizable state interest under the Establishment Clause. And, perhaps
more importantly, it does not explain the requisite relationship between the state’s
Establishment Clause interest and its chosen means of achieving that interest. Because
the test does not provide these details, it is, as of now, quite manipulable.
This manipulability is evident in the fact that by merely reciting its interest in
protecting the consciences of state taxpayers, a state can satisfy this test every time it
refuses to fund a religious organization. For instance, a state opposing religious
education could exclude religious schools from its K-12 voucher program by claiming
that its Blaine Amendment, which is derived from the taxpayer’s conscience, prohibits it
from funding religious education. Indeed, there is already evidence of states citing Davey
for this proposition, as the Florida Supreme Court recently interpreted the Florida State
Constitution to compel the state to exclude religious schools from a K-12 voucher
program, and found that the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by the Court in Davey,
permitted the state to exclude these schools.175 Thus, under the Davey formulation,
states can discriminate against religion whenever they want—even when the motives are
not religion-neutral, even when the means are not religion-neutral, and even when the
effects are not religion-neutral.
Even more problematic than Davey permitting states to discriminate against all
religions arbitrarily is the possibility that states may favor one religious group over
another. Since withdrawing members of one religious organization from a general
funding program partially reduces the burden imposed on taxpayers of funding religion,
175
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states have an interest under the conscientious burden justification in refusing to fund one
denomination. To be sure, states have a greater interest for refusing to fund all
denominations. But, under the conscientious burden rationale, states also have an
interest in refusing to fund only one denomination.
For this reason, Justice Scalia expressed concern in oral argument that if the Court
held that states may discriminate on the basis of religion, as Washington urged the Court
to rule, then, a fortiori, states also must be able to discriminate on the basis of one
religion. To determine whether there is a limiting principle prohibiting sect-specific
discrimination, Justice Scalia asked Washington’s counsel whether her argument meant
that it would be constitutional for Washington to fund all religious instruction except for,
say, Jewish studies. After Washington’s counsel failed to provide a case explaining why
discrimination generally against all religions is permissible but discrimination
specifically against one religion is not, it seemed that by ruling for Washington the Court
necessarily would abandon the most settled proposition in church-state law since 1947—
that both Clauses require “the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers.”176
That Davey can lead to the abandonment of the neutrality principle raises more
than mere stare decisis concerns. If the Court were to abandon this principle, the Court
would uproot the central criterion—whether or not an act is neutral towards religion—in
adjudicating church-state issues, thereby leaving the Court’s jurisprudence in disarray.
Furthermore, because the principle has explained what it means for religion to be
constitutionally distinct—religion’s distinctiveness requires the government to treat
religion neutrally—and because the principle has reduced the inherent tension between
176
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the Clauses—since both Clauses require the government to treat religion neutrally, the
principle mitigates the concern that the government will violate one directive by
vigorously enforcing the other—abandoning the principle would complicate the question
of how distinct religion is and how the Clauses relate. In sum, if the Davey rule is going
to be a workable rule, it must be squared with this neutrality principle.
B. Squaring the Davey Rule with the Neutrality Principle
While the neutrality principle has accomplished the two important feats of
explaining what it means for religion to be constitutionally distinct and of reducing the
inherent tension between the Clauses, the principle has raised a new problem: What does
it mean to be neutral? Even though most of the Justices agree that neutrality is the
baseline for adjudicating church-state issues, the Justices disagree sharply about what
neutrality means.
Some Justices believe that neutrality requires strict separation between
government and religion. Reading neutrality this way, the Court has held that the Free
Exercise Clause compels the government to exempt religious groups from formally
neutral laws, 177 and that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from directly
funding religious organizations.178
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Other Justices, however, believe that neutrality is merely a formal requirement.
In contrast to the separationst model of neutrality, formal neutrality disregards the effects
of the law at issue and instead focuses on its terms. The Rehnquist Court incorporated
this idea of formal neutrality into both Clauses, holding that the Free Exercise Clause
does not require the government to exempt a citizen from a law that substantially burdens
her religious exercise if the law is generally applicable and neutral,179 and that the
government may fund religious organizations so long as the funding criteria do not
consider the religious affiliation of the recipient.180
As illustrated in the Court’s case law there is not much overlap between a substantive
and a formal conception of religion-neutrality. The problem lies in the term “neutrality”—it
does not have one meaning. As Justice Harlan has noted, neutrality is “a coat of many
colors.”181 Similarly, literary theorist Stanley Fish believes that religion-neutrality is
meaningless as an independent criterion because neutrality “has meaning only within some
particular set of background conditions.”182 Perhaps Harvard Divinity School Professor
Ronald Thiemann captures the problem best when he calls the Court’s notion of neutrality “a
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protean concept.”183 Just as in Ulysses, where James Joyce spun readers into a maelstrom by
introducing the stream of consciousness in the chapter “Proteus,”184 the Court has lost
followers of the Court by introducing its protean concept of neutrality into church-state
jurisprudence.
However, in searching for the meaning of religion-neutrality, the Court has
accomplished two important tasks: one, the Court has proven that religious-neutrality
does not have one meaning, and two, the Court has established how different meanings of
neutrality can apply to the Religion Clauses. As a result of the Court’s search for a
neutral relationship between religion and government, we know that, at its most strict, the
Free Exercise Clause requires the government to exempt religious believers from
facially-neutral laws when the laws substantially burden their religious exercise.
However, at its least strict, the Free Exercise Clause requires the government to
invalidate laws that are either not generally applicable or not facially neutral towards
religion. And as a result of the Court’s search for a neutral relationship between religion
and government, we know that, at its most strict, the Establishment Clause means that the
government may not interact with religion when doing so has the effect of promoting
religion. But at its least strict, the Establishment Clause means that the government may
interact with religion so long as in doing so it is evenhanded towards both religion and
non-religion. The Court has thus set the ceiling and the floor for how the government
may treat religious matters. This is crucial to a state seeking to determine how it may
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treat religious matters under its constitution because federal ceilings and floors form the
framework of state law.185
Thus, a state should have the discretion to partner with religion above the floor of
formal neutrality, so long as it remains below the ceiling of substantive neutrality. This
functions best in a direct funding scheme. For example, based on a substantive
conception of neutrality, if a state decides to provide funding to schools, the state may
provide funding to secular schools without including religious schools in the program.186
Conversely, based on a formal conception of neutrality, states may include schools in the
program when the funding criteria do not refer to religion.187
However, this linear paradigm does not apply as easily to indirect funding
schemes like the Promise Scholarship. Finding the floor is the simple part. When private
beneficiaries choose how they want to use government funds, the floor is the Zelman
decision. Thus, so long as private beneficiaries independently choose their schools, the
government funding of religious schools is permissible. But for the government to go
above the floor, the government must prevent beneficiaries from funding religion. To do
this, the government must single out religious organizations from the program. And by
singling out religion, the government violates the core requirement of formal neutrality.
In such situations, any attempt to build above the floor thereby pulls the state below the
floor. This is the circle created by the neutrality requirement of the Religion Clauses. As
185
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Chief Justice Burger wrote, “The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be
an absolutely straight line.”188 Reducing the Clauses to a linear equation of ceilings and
floors therefore appears futile—it is like finding a ceiling in a circular room.
A ceiling is found in this circular room by examining the Court’s interpretation of
what it means to be neutral when the government singles out religion. In this respect,
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos189 provides
some help. In Amos, the complainants argued that exemption for religious organizations
violated the Establishment Clause by impermissibly “drawing distinctions on religious
grounds.”190 The Court rejected this claim, ruling that when the government
discriminates between religion and non-religion, the law is valid under the Establishment
Clause so long as it is “motivated by a permissible purpose of limiting governmental
interference with the exercise of religion.”191 The idea is that when the government seeks
to achieve a goal of the Free Exercise Clause, the government does not, as the Amos
Court put it, “abandon neutrality”192 if in pursuing the goal the government goes beyond
what the Court has interpreted the Clause to require.
In Davey, the situation was exactly like that in Amos—but the reverse. In Amos,
the issue was whether the government violated the Establishment Clause by passing a law
that classified based on religion in order to provide liberty for religious organizations.
The Amos Court upheld the law because the law’s purpose was related to the aim of the
Free Exercise Clause—religious liberty. In Davey, the issue was whether the government
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violated the Free Exercise Clause by pursuing an aim of the Establishment Clause—
disestablishment of religion.
Amos therefore means that the government should be able to protect the interests
of the Establishment Clause more than the Clause requires. Thus, if the government
justifies a law with an interest that is not in line with those interests connected with the
Establishment Clause, the law is not neutral towards religion under the Court’s
jurisprudence. As such, the law is above the ceiling and it therefore violates the U.S.
Constitution. But if the government offers a substantial interest under the Establishment
Clause, the law is neutral towards religion, and accordingly, the act should be upheld.
This application of Amos to the Establishment Clause, however, does not answer
Justice Scalia’s question as to whether the government may discriminate against all
religious organizations but not against only one religious denomination. If Amos means
that states satisfy the Free Exercise Clause whenever they discriminate on the basis of
religion so long as they connect the discrimination to religious disestablishment, wouldn’t
that mean that states may exclude certain denominations from funding programs, since
such exclusions partially achieve religious disestablishment?
The answer is that even though excluding one religious denomination from a
program partially achieves religious disestablishment, doing so is not permissible because
discrimination on the basis of religion is not religion-neutral—not under either a
substantive or a formal conception of neutrality under either Clause. The Court has said
as much, though perhaps not quite in that language.
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In Larson v. Valente,193 for example, the Court struck down a Minnesota law
providing that “only those religious organizations that received more than half of their
total contributions from members or affiliated organizations would remain exempt from
the registration and reporting requirements.”194 Although the law did not facially
discriminate among religious sects, the law had a disparate effect on different religious
sects, burdening non-traditional religions, which usually acquire funds through
solicitations, while not burdening traditional religions, which rarely acquire funds
through such means.195 After finding abundant evidence in the record that Minnesota
legislators intended to discriminate against particular religious groups in enacting the law,
the Court concluded that the law violated the Establishment Clause.196
So laws intended to favor or disfavor certain religious groups are not religionneutral if they succeed in doing so. But what about laws that expressly favor or disfavor
certain religious groups? Intuitively, this would seem more problematic, since what is
prohibited in substance is almost always prohibited in form. And this intuition finds
significant support in the case law.
In Larson, Justices White and Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the Religion
Clauses prohibit the government from expressly preferring one religion over another, but
permit the government to pass laws that have a disparate impact on different religions.
They concluded that the Minnesota law was constitutional because it did not expressly
prefer one religion over another.197
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Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed this view in other cases as well. Dissenting in
Wallace v. Jaffree,198 he claimed that a primary purpose of the Religion Clauses was “to
stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference for one religious denomination
or sect over others.”199 Justice Thomas echoed this argument in Rosenberger v. Rector,200
concluding that the government may fund religion when it does not prefer any religious
faith because “the Framers saw the Establishment Clause simply as a prohibition on
governmental preferences for some religious faiths over others.”201 In fact, the
proposition that the government may not pass laws facially preferring one religion is so
settled that in searching for the original meaning of the Religion Clauses one
commentator has claimed that express preferentialism is all that the Framers intended to
prohibit.202 Thus, whether or not one adopts a substantive or a formal conception of
neutrality, singling out one religious group for favored or disfavored treatment is not
religion-neutral.
Since the Court held in Larson that preferentialism violates the neutrality
principle contained in the Religion Clauses, that means that under either a substantive or
a formalist definition of neutrality the government’s favoring of some religions and
disfavoring of others cannot be characterized as religion-neutral. Therefore, when the
government passes a law that singles out religion, the Religion Clauses require that the
law not prefer some religions over others. Thus, if Amos can be applied to government
198
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policies seeking religious disestablishment, that means that the government may not pass
a law that discriminates on the basis of one religion, even if it partially achieves religious
disestablishment.
Now we have filed the holes in Davey, bringing this paradigm to fruition. Davey
means that a state may discriminate on the basis of religion within a generally available
funding program that does not directly affect an individual’s ability to participate in the
political community only if the state’s religious classification relates to a cognizable
Establishment Clause interest. The problem with this rule is that it seems to permit the
use of non-neutral means in achieving the Establishment Clause interest. Amos corrects
this problem, providing that the government does not offend one Religion Clause in
singling out religion if the government establishes a connection between the law and the
interests contained in the other Clause, and if in doing so the government does not use
means that abandon the neutrality principle. And Larson tells us that when the
government passes a law that expressly or purposely favors or disfavors one religion to
others, the law is not religion-neutral.
Putting all of this together, the new paradigm is this: In an indirect funding
program, a state may go above the requirements of the Establishment Clause by
excluding religious organizations from generally available funding programs so long as
the state has a substantial religion-neutral interest under the Establishment Clause. Being
that the two primary interests expressed in the Establishment Clause are, one, to protect
the consciences of taxpayers and, two, to encourage harmony among different religions,
the state must seek each of these two interests in order for its exclusion of religion to be a
substantial interest under the Establishment Clause. And since the government must use
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religion-neutral means, and since discriminating on the basis of one religion is not
religion-neutral, the government must exclude all religions if it is going to exclude any.
With this as the standard, states will be limited in how much higher than the
Establishment Clause they can go. Washington, for example, would not have satisfied
this scrutiny by asserting only an interest in protecting the consciences of its taxpayers.
Instead, Washington would have to demonstrate, in addition to how the exclusion
protected the consciences of taxpayers, how the exclusion protected its residents from
religious friction. Despite the fact that Washington did not demonstrate how it was
protecting its people from religious friction, the Davey reasoning and outcome are right.
Sure, the Court’s reasoning was underdeveloped in that the Court did not explain fully
how the exclusion fits with the meaning of the Religion Clauses. And sure,
Washington’s failure to justify its exclusion of Davey makes the outcome questionable.
But, at its core, the Davey reasoning and outcome are right—because there were
substantial reasons under the Establishment Clause for excluding the study of religion
from the Promise Scholarship, because these reasons are at the heart of the meaning of
the Establishment Clause, and because the Court properly recognized that states have
much to contribute in finding the appropriate balance between religious liberty and
disestablishment.
CONCLUSION
The Religion Clauses are so difficult to grasp, intellectually, and so difficult to
settle, doctrinally, because the Clauses are inherently contradictory. Thus, it might be
appropriate that the paradigm developed in this Article rests on its own contradictory
foundation—that, by searching for one Religion Clause principle, the Court created
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many, and that these many principles can be combined to create a unitary standard for the
states to follow.
The protean meaning of neutrality gives the states discretion and therefore
preserves the federalist nature of the Religion Clauses. This truly brings us back to the
meaning of protean. Just as Menelaus could find his way back home to Helen only by
taking a hold of Proteus, a sea god who could change his shape at will, we can bring
church-state relations back to the states by holding on to the Court’s protean concept of
neutrality.
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